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Abstract 
 
Alexithymic traits have been consistently found to be associated with deficits in 
social functioning. These social deficits in individuals with alexithymic traits have 
been suggested to be related to the reduced levels of empathy in those with 
alexithymic traits. Factors underlying this relationship, however, are presently not 
understood. Such an understanding may provide insight into addressing the empathy 
deficits seen in alexithymic individuals. This study aimed to support prior studies 
that indicate a relationship between cognitive and affective alexithymic traits and 
cognitive and affective domains of empathy, respectively. A preliminary 
investigation of the impact of emotion recognition ability (anger, fear, sadness) and 
metacognitive ability on the relationship between alexithymic traits and empathy 
was also of interest. One hundred and twenty participants aged between 18 and 55 
years (68 females; M = 24.95, SD = 7.19) completed the Toronto Alexithymia Scale 
– 20, the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), the Emotion Recognition Task (ERT) 
and provided confidence ratings for each presented emotion of the ERT to assess 
metacognitive ability. The study identified negative relationships between cognitive 
alexithymic traits, and cognitive empathy across the emotions of anger, fear, and 
sadness. A moderated mediation effect for this relationship was also found for the 
emotion sadness. The findings suggest poor emotion recognition of sadness 
negatively impacts the relationship between cognitive alexithymic traits and 
cognitive empathy, but only for those with low levels of metacognitive ability. No 
significant relationships were found between affective alexithymic traits and 
affective empathy. These findings upon further testing in a clinical population may 
contribute to addressing empathy deficits seen in alexithymic individuals, in order to 
improve their social functioning.  
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Emotions give meaning and texture to everyday life, enhance connections 
with others, drive behaviour, and inform individuals about needs, frustrations and 
rights (Smith & Lazarus, 1990; Leahy, 2012). Thus, the ability to correctly identify 
another’s emotions (e.g., through facial expressions), and display empathy towards 
them, is a fundamental aspect of social competence and communication (Decety & 
Lamm, 2006). With increasing research demonstrating detrimental social and 
interpersonal effects associated with deficits in the ability to interpret and respond to 
the emotions of another, constructs underlying these difficulties have been 
investigated. One construct which has received an increasing amount of interest is 
that of alexithymia.  
Alexithymia is a psychological construct characterised by difficulties in 
identifying, analysing and verbalising emotions (Grynberg et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, alexithymic individuals have a tendency to demonstrate an externally 
oriented cognitive style, a restricted imaginal capacity, and confusion between 
emotions and the accompanied physical sensations (Grynberg et al., 2012; Taylor, 
Bagby, & Parker). Initially introduced by Nemiah and Sifneos in the early 1970’s, 
Alexithymia was a term used to describe a group of behaviours commonly occurring 
together in individuals with psychosomatic disorders (Sifneos, 1973; Van der Velde 
et al., 2013). Alexithymia is often regarded as a condition due to its organic basis in 
the brain, however many authors conceptualise alexithymia as a multidimensional 
personality construct, comprising of both affective and cognitive dimensions 
(Mattila et al., 2010).  
The affective dimension of alexithymia contains two facets: difficulty 
identifying feelings in oneself, and difficulty describing one’s own feelings (Loas et 
al., 2001). This difficulty in identifying and describing one’s own feelings, involves 
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an undifferentiated emotional awareness and diminished emotional expression, 
respectively (Demers & Koven, 2015, Jongen et al., 2014). On the other hand, the 
cognitive dimension of alexithymia is characterized by the specific tendency to focus 
attention externally, and to engage in a concrete, practical style of thinking (Jongen 
et al., 2014; Nicolò et al., 2011). Put simply, affective alexithymic traits are 
primarily associated with “feelings” in oneself, whereas cognitive alexithymic traits 
are more so related to the process of “thinking” about emotions in one’s self.  
 The prevalence of alexithymic traits in adults within the general population 
has been estimated to be approximately 5-13% (Franz et al., 2008; Mattila, Salimen, 
Numini, & Joukamaa, 2006), however in clinical samples this estimation is higher at 
40-67% (Loas, Fremaux, Otmani, Lecercle, & Delahousee, 1997; Lyvers, Hinton, 
Edwards, & Thorberg, 2015). Alexithymia is regarded as a trans-diagnostic deficit, 
meaning it is a common condition associated with several disorders (Grynberg et al., 
2012). Some disorders that are highly comorbid with alexithymic traits, and are seen 
to be a risk factor for alexithymia include: schizophrenia, autism spectrum disorder, 
anxiety disorders, somatoform disorders, eating disorders, depressive disorders, 
personality disorders, sexual disorders, post-traumatic stress disorder, and substance 
use disorders (Cochrane, Brewerton, Wilson, & Hodges, 1993; Duddu, Isaac & 
Chaturvedi, 2003; Fukunishi, Kikuchi, Wogan & Takubo, 1997; Michetti, Rossi, 
Bonanno, Tiesi, Simonelli, 2006; Thorberg, Young, Sullivan, Lyvers, 2009; Van’t 
Wout, Aleman, Bermond & Kahn, 2007).                                                                      
Aetiology of Alexithymic Traits 
The origin of alexithymia is not fully understood; however, a combination of 
environmental, psychological and neurological factors have been proposed. A theory 
that provides a possible explanation for the cognitive and affective emotion 
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difficulties found in those with alexithymic traits, is Lane and Scwartzs’ (1987) 
cognitive-developmental theory of emotional awareness. This theory suggests that 
emotional awareness is a cognitive skill where individuals progress from lower to 
higher stages of emotional awareness, similar to Piagets’ theory of cognitive 
development (Timoney & Holder, 2013). More specifically, individuals with higher 
levels of alexithymic traits generally function at a preoperational level where 
individual feelings are biologically experienced, yet their awareness of these 
emotions are limited or restricted, and they struggle to see the perspective of others 
(Lemche et al., 2004). This limited emotional awareness has been suggested to be 
due to maladaptive experiences during childhood driven from feelings of isolation, 
and/or experiencing trauma or neglect (Karukivi & Saarijärvi, 2014). It is suggested 
that often children develop various defence mechanisms in response to adverse 
emotional experiences (Gilbert, 2000). Thus, alexithymic traits may arise as a 
defence mechanism to emotional trauma (Krystal, 1982). This suggestion has been 
supported by several studies. For example, Barenbaum (1996) found alexithymic 
traits to be positively associated with a history of childhood abuse. Further, Lumley, 
Mader, Gramzow and Papineau (1996) demonstrated an association between 
alexithymic traits and general psychopathology in the family throughout the child’s 
years of early development.    
The suggestion of the impact of emotional trauma in the development of 
alexithymic traits, is echoed in an alternative neuroanatomical account of 
alexithymia. Parker, Keightley, Smith and Taylor (1999) suggest that in those with 
alexithymic traits, there is an interhemispheric deficit in the transfer of emotional 
information from the right hemisphere of the brain to the language regions in the left 
hemisphere. This in turn reduces the ability to label or verbalise emotions. This 
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interhemispheric deficit has been suggested to be due to reduced connectivity in the 
corpus callosum, which interestingly is an area of the brain also thought to be 
compromised in those who have suffered childhood trauma (De Belis, Spratt & 
Hooper, 2011; Paul, 2011). This neuroanatomical account provides a possible 
suggestion of an interplay between neuroanatomical structures, and the 
aforementioned social and psychological factors such as trauma and/or neglect as 
described in Lane and Schwartzs’ (1987) theory. As there is no conclusive evidence 
on this distinct distribution of hemispheric functions, this account may only partially 
explain the development of alexithymic traits, therefore other models have been 
proposed.  
Another neuroanatomical account of the aetiology of alexithymia is that 
proposed by Lane, Ahern, Scwartz & Kazniaz (2007). The ‘blindfeel’ hypothesis 
suggests that the impaired emotional processing in alexithymic individuals lies in the 
conscious self-awareness of emotions in one’s self, which is implicated in several 
critical brain regions. This includes the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), which is 
involved in the generation, appraisal and expression of emotions, and also the insula, 
striatum and amygdala, which are involved in emotional awareness and the detection 
of emotional significance (Lane, Reiman, Axelrod, & Yun, 1998; Heinzel et al., 
2010). This hypothesis has been supported extensively in the literature, including 
brain imaging studies in both non-clinical and clinical samples (Demers, Olson, 
Crowley, Rauch, Rosso, 2015; Moriguchi & Komaki, 2013). Several authors suggest 
that low activation in the aforementioned neural regions may be an underlying 
explanation for the impaired emotional processing in alexithymic individuals (Kano, 
Fukudo, 2013; Van der Velde et al., 2013).                                                                                                 
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Alexithymic Traits and Social-Cognitive Functioning                                                                                
The cognitive and affective difficulties associated with alexithymic 
individuals have been consistently demonstrated to have pervasive, and often 
enduring social and interpersonal consequences. For example, alexithymic 
individuals have a reduced capacity to establish and maintain meaningful 
relationships (Lumley, Stettner & Wehmer, 1996). This is of great importance as the 
absence of meaningful social relationships has been closely related to poorer mental 
health, and reduced quality of life (Diener & Seligman, 2002). In addition, Spitzer, 
Siebel-Jürges, Barnow, Grabe and Freyberger (2005) suggest that alexithymic 
individuals are often deficient in having the essential qualities required for effective 
social communication, and often they lack a basic desire for social closeness and 
support. As a consequence, alexithymic individuals often experience high levels of 
family, romantic and social loneliness (Qualter, Quinton, Wagner, & Brown, 2009), 
and display a tendency to engage in relationships at a superficial level (Guttman & 
Laporte, 2002). These interpersonal difficulties are also of concern in clinical 
settings, as the client-therapist relationship has been demonstrated to be a strong 
marker of therapeutic effectiveness (Saunders, 2001). 
These social and interpersonal impairments in alexithymic individuals have 
been proposed to be due to underlying impairments in social cognition (Aaron, 
Benson, Park, 2013). Social cognition is defined as the ability to identify, perceive, 
and interpret interpersonal cues displayed by others and apply this information in 
social interactions to guide behaviour (Amodio & Frith, 2006; McDonald, Honan, 
Kelly, Byom, & Rushby, 2013). Good social cognitive skills enable an individual to 
effectively communicate, share experiences, establish and maintain relationships, 
and predict the behaviour of another (McDonald, 2013). Adolphs (2003) suggests 
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that because humans are intensely social animals, social cognition is an evolutionary 
imperative, which has developed independently from non-social information 
processing skills in order to survive. This distinction between non-social and social 
cognition, is supported by several studies. For example, Happé (1994) suggests 
individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder appear to have an inordinate difficulty 
with social information, despite average or above average functioning in other 
cognitive domains. In addition, individuals with discrete frontal lesions often present 
with disproportionately impaired social functioning in comparison to their general 
cognition (McDonald, Honan, Kelly, Byom, Rushby, 2013; Tranel, Bechara, & 
Denburg, 2002). Social cognition encompasses both lower order social cognitive 
abilities such as emotion recognition, and also higher-order social cognitive abilities 
such as Theory of Mind (ToM) and empathy (Javed & Charles, 2018).  
Emotion recognition is defined as a context-sensitive process involving the 
ability to perceive and recognize emotional information in others (Grynberg et al., 
2012). This emotional information is detected through the integration of various cues 
derived from another person’s body movement and gestures, speech, and 
importantly, facial expressions (Grynberg et al., 2012). The face, especially the eye 
region, plays a critical role in the expression of emotions, providing a quick 
indication of the person’s feelings or possible intended behaviour (Parker, Taylor & 
Bagby, 1993). Unlike other emotional cues such as posture, or body language, facial 
expressions can be both universal and culturally specific (depending on the 
emotion), making them very important in daily emotional communication and social 
functioning (Matsumoto, Keltner, Shiota, Frank & Sullivan, 2008). Deficits in 
recognising the emotions of another can result in misunderstandings, and incorrect 
interpretation of intent and reaction (Walter et al., 2011). Thus, emotion recognition 
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is an essential aspect of human interaction, and is suggested to be critical for 
engaging in higher-order social cognitive abilities (Jayed & Charles, 2018). ToM 
refers to the ability to attribute mental states to oneself, and another (Singer, 2006). 
This understanding facilitates the process of recognising that each individual has 
their own set of beliefs, intentions, desires, emotions, and knowledge that can be 
applied to create meaningful social interactions (Meltzoff & Gopnik, 1994). 
Empathy, another higher order social-cognitive ability builds upon the ToM 
hypothesis, from an understanding that another has a mental state, to the capacity to 
respond to another’s mental with an appropriate emotion (Baron-Cohen, 2000).  
Empathy  
Empathy varies largely in definition, yet generally it is regarded as the ability 
to experience and understand the momentary emotional state of another (Salazar-
Lopez et al., 2015). The ability to be empathetic plays a critical role in both 
interpersonal and social domains. It enables individuals to express experiences, 
desires, and needs appropriately between each other, and it facilitates the process of 
pro-social behaviour through providing a connection with others within a social 
environment (Riess, 2017). Empathy allows an individual to understand reasons 
behind human behaviour, and the impact an individual’s actions can have on another 
(Decety & Lamm, 2006). Behavioural and neural deficits in the capacity to be 
empathetic are characteristic of many psychiatric populations, suggesting empathy is 
a relevant trans-diagnostic dimension (Decety & Moriguchi, 2007). This indicates 
deficits in this ability have various implications for functional impairment and 
treatment development (Valdespino, Antezana, Ghane, Richey, 2017). 
   Similar to alexithymia, empathy can be broken down into two inter-related, 
yet distinct dimensions: cognitive empathy and affective empathy (Joliffe & 
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Farrington, 2006; Cox et al., 2012). Current evolutionary evidence indicates empathy 
is mediated by several brain systems including the phylogenetically early emotional 
contagion system and more advanced cognitive perspective-taking system (De 
Waal, 2007). The early emotional contagion system relates to affective empathy, the 
ability to feel and share the emotional experience of another (Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). 
According to Preston and De Wahls’ (2002) perception-action hypothesis, the 
perception of behaviour in another results in an automatic representation of that 
behaviour in one’s self. This process is referred to as ‘simulation’ and is facilitated 
through mirror neurons in the premotor cortex (Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). Given mirror 
neurons are initiated both when an individual engages in a behaviour, and also when 
that individual observes that behaviour in another, they help individuals to share the 
experience of another (Carr, Lacoboni, Dubeaut, Mazziota, & Lenzi, 2003; Rizzolatti 
& Sinigaglia, 2010). Numerous brain imaging studies support this notion revealing 
the same key neural areas are activated both when observing another’s emotional 
state, and also when the emotional state is experienced by the self (Blackmore & 
Frith, 2005; Wicker et al., 2003). Activity associated with affective empathy 
involves brain regions involved in emotional processing (thalamus), emotional 
awareness (right anterior insula), understanding/simulating other actions (inferior 
parietal lobule), and the perception of faces and bodies (fusiform gyrus; Carr et al., 
2003; Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Goldsher, Berger & Aharaon-Peretz, 2004). This 
state-matching reaction is a bottom up process, whereby the process of ‘simulation’ 
results in an individual being able to achieve a similar state of feeling (Shamay-
Tsoory, 2011). Put simply, affective empathy is our automatic drive to respond 
appropriately to another’s emotions (Ang & Goh, 2010).  
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The more advanced cognitive perspective taking system relates to cognitive 
empathy. Cognitive empathy is a top-down process and is defined as the capacity to 
understand the emotional state of another, based upon our ability to distinguish 
ourselves from others (Jankowiak-Siuda, Rymarczyk, & Grabowska, 2011). More 
specifically, cognitive empathy is the capacity to recognise that an individual may be 
experiencing particular emotions, enabling insight into another’s beliefs, actions, 
desires and intentions (Hein & Singer, 2008). Hence, cognitive empathy is often 
used synonymously with the term ‘affective ToM’ (Olderbak, Sassenrath, Keller & 
Wilhelm, 2014). Brain regions thought to mediate cognitive empathy include the 
fusiform gyrus (involved in facial and body recognition), parrahippocampal gyrus 
(involved in memory encoding and retrieval), and the cuneus (responsible for 
integrating somatosensory information with other sensory stimuli, as well as learning 
and attention) (Rameson, Morelli, & Lieberman, 2012, Völlm et al., 2006).  
Although the affective and cognitive dimensions of empathy can be 
distinguished at the level of regional activation in the brain (Fan, Duncan, Greck & 
Northoff, 2011), the ability of empathy is mediated by a core neural network, which 
facilitates the processes of the cognitive and affective dimensions. In a whole brain 
quantitative meta-analysis of fMRI studies, it was revealed that the anterior mid 
cingulate cortex (aMCC), dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), bilateral anterior 
insula, and supplementary motor area (SMA) are consistently activated in empathy 
(Fan et al., 2011). Some of these key neural regions within the network of empathy 
including the ACC, insula, and striatum, have been determined to partially overlap 
with the brain regions associated with alexithymic traits, providing a possible 
explanation for the empathy deficits seen in alexithymic individuals.         
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Alexithymia and Empathy !
According to the shared networks model (2012), brain networks responsible 
for emotional processing in the self, involve the same key neural regions involved in 
the representation of emotions in others (Bernhart & Singer, 2012; Bird et al., 2010). 
As empathy and alexithymia share some of the same key neural regions including 
the ACC, insula, and striatum, a disruption in these areas would likely affect the 
processes underlying both alexithymia and empathy (Bernhart & Singer, 2012; Bird 
et al., 2010). It makes sense that the ability to identify or understand one’s own 
emotions is a necessary step in the ability to identify or understand the feelings of 
another (i.e., empathy), and this notion is supported strongly throughout the 
literature.  
Early clinical (Krystal, 1979) investigation and empirical research has 
confirmed a negative relationship between alexithymic traits and empathy, in both 
clinical and non-clinical populations (Råstam, Gillberg, Gillberg, & Johansson, 
1997). For example, Moriguchi et al., (2007) in a sample of healthy college students 
revealed a negative relationship between empathy and alexithymia. In another study, 
Guttman and Laporte (2002) explored the relationship between the cognitive and 
affective dimensions of alexithymic traits and empathy with the use of the Toronto 
Alexithymia Scale-20 (TAS-20; Bagby, Parker & Taylor, 1994) and the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980). Their analysis revealed negative 
relationships between the affective components of the TAS-20 (difficulty identifying 
feelings, DIF; difficulty describing feelings, DDF), and the affective components of 
the IRI (personal distress, PD; empathic concern, EC). In addition, negative 
relationships between the cognitive sub-scales of the IRI, perspective taking (PT) 
and fantasy (F) with the cognitive sub-scale of the TAS-20 (externally oriented 
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thinking, EOT) were observed. Grynberg et al., (2012) found similar results, 
revealing the cognitive (EOT with F and PT) and affective (DIF and DDF with PD) 
dimensions of alexithymia and empathy to be negatively related. Although the 
relationship between alexithymic traits and empathy, and their cognitive and 
affective dimensions are firmly established, factors underlying this relationship are 
not at present understood, which is a primary aim of the present study.   
In order to understand the complex relationship between alexithymic traits 
and empathy, and gain insight into possible mechanisms, theoretical models have 
been applied to this relationship. The Self-to-Other Model of Empathy outlined by 
Bird and Viding (2014) suggests that in alexithymic individuals there is a disruption 
within the affective representation system, which is involved in the 
representation/simulation of another’s affective state. Due to a disruption in the 
affective representation system, alexithymic individuals suffer a reduction in the 
ability to form a consciously accessible representation of their own affective states. 
Therefore, through a lack of differentiated affective states, these individuals are 
provided no opportunity to learn the perceptual cues associated with those states in 
another, impacting upon empathy processing in a number of ways (Bird & Viding, 
2014; Valdespino et al., 2017). For example, an individual may be aware they are 
experiencing an emotion but unsure what emotion they are experiencing (consistent 
with Lane and Scwartz’s (1987) ideas of pre-operational processing), or they may be 
aware another has had a change in emotional state, yet they cannot identify what 
emotion. When detailing the Self-to-Other Model of Empathy, Bird and Viding 
(2014) argued that an atypical affective representation system is likely to involve 
deficits in emotion recognition. Despite this, and the understanding that lower order 
social cognitive abilities (i.e., emotion recognition) are needed for higher order 
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social cognitive abilities (i.e., empathy), limited research has examined whether 
emotion recognition impacts the relationship between alexithymia and empathy. This 
limitation of the previous research is important to address, as not only will this 
provide further insight to Bird and Viding’s (2014) theoretical account, it may 
provide potential answers to addressing the empathy deficits seen in alexithymic 
individuals.  
Emotion Recognition as a Mediator 
In line with the shared networks model (2012), emotion recognition ability 
represents a compelling mediator of the relationship between alexithymic traits and 
empathy. In an fMRI study by Marsh et al., (2008), it was demonstrated that emotion 
recognition ability is mediated by activity in the anterior insula, ACC and amygdala, 
some of the same key neural regions which form central networks for both 
alexithymia and empathy. This may suggest that if these brain regions are 
compromised, both lower order social cognitive abilities (i.e., emotion recognition) 
and higher order social cognitive abilities (i.e., empathy) could be impacted, and 
these deficits could be associated with the impairments seen in alexithymic 
individuals.   
Strong support in the research has determined that individuals high in 
alexithymic traits have deficits in recognising facial expressions (Cook, Brewer, 
Shah, & Bird, 2013; Parker, Taylor, & Bagby, 1993). For example, Lane, Sechrest, 
Riedal, Shapiro, and Kaszniak (2000) found alexithymia scores to be negatively 
correlated with the ability to identify Ekman and Friesan’s (1976) six basic universal 
emotions (happiness, surprise, disgust, anger, fear, sadness). In addition, a large 
systematic review of the literature by Grynberg et al., (2012) determined that in both 
clinical disorders and ‘healthy’ populations levels of alexithymia were strongly 
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correlated with deficits in recognising and labelling all six basic emotions. Despite 
some studies finding no relationship between alexithymia scores and the 
identification of emotional expressions (McDonald & Prkachin, 1990; Mayer, 
DiPaulo, and Salovey, 1990), these studies have been criticised due to using 
unreliable measures and lacking power through the use of small sample sizes.   
There is strong support that emotion recognition deficits in alexithymic 
individuals are worse for negative, compared to positive valence emotions (Grynberg 
et al., 2012). Importantly, recognising negative valence emotions is associated with 
greater social and interpersonal difficulties, due to their association with 
vulnerability and threat (Berthoz et al., 2002). Being unable to identify when 
someone is feeling angry or sad for instance, is likely to have greater negative 
implications then being unable to detect an individual feeling happy. In a study by 
Prkachin, Casey and Prkachin (2009) high levels of alexithymic traits were 
associated with marked deficits in recognising sadness, anger, and fear, however this 
effect was not as strong for the emotions of happiness, surprise, and disgust. Overall, 
it appears that the negatively valenced emotions appear harder to detect in those with 
alexithymic traits, and an ability to detect these emotions may be more critical for 
social and interpersonal functioning.   
The argument for emotion recognition to mediate the relationship between 
alexithymic traits and empathy, is also supported by studies demonstrating 
associations between emotion recognition and empathy. For example, Bessel (2006) 
demonstrated that a reduced ability to recognise emotions, was associated with a 
reduction in the ability to be empathetic. Furthermore, some recent preliminary 
research in a non-clinical population provides support for the likely role of emotion 
recognition in the relationship between alexithymic traits and empathy. Lyvers, 
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McCann, Coundoris, Edwards, & Thorberg (2018) demonstrated that the negative 
relationship between the TAS-20 cognitive sub-scale EOT and cognitive empathy 
was partially mediated by impaired emotion recognition. This finding is supported 
by Grynbergs (2012) suggestion that the relationship between alexithymic traits and 
empathy may be logically attributed to deficient facial recognition of emotions. 
Although these preliminary results are promising, the study by Lyvers et al., (2018) 
did not examine the affective dimensions of alexithymic traits and empathy. In 
addition, this study utilised the Reading in the Mind Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen, 2001) 
to assess emotion recognition ability, which has been shown to lack internal 
consistency reliability and ecological validity (Olderbak, Wilhelm, Olaru, Geiger, 
Brenneman, & Roberts, 2015). Therefore, the current study will address these 
limitations. In addition, the current study will also examine additional factors which 
may be impacting the relationship between alexithymic traits and empathy, such as 
awareness of emotion recognition performance.  
Metacognition 
Metacognition is a higher-order cognitive process involving the ability to 
understand the thinking of one’s self and others and to use this knowledge to 
problem solve and learn (Dimaggio et al., 2007). There is little doubt that accurate 
metacognition would be a valuable skill within the context of emotion recognition, 
and social functioning more broadly. An individual with good metacognitive skills 
can be aware of one’s own ability (or lack of) to detect emotions in others, use this 
knowledge to take more time, or use alternative methods to compensate for 
difficulties such as asking how the other person is feeling. This may prevent an 
individual from arriving at an incorrect conclusion, and allow the individual to 
respond more appropriately, so that negative social and interpersonal consequences 
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can be avoided (Benjamin, Bjork, & Schwart, 1998; Finn, 2008). The MAMID 
cognitive affective architecture outlined by Hudlika (2005, 2008) suggests emotional 
deficits (i.e., emotion recognition), are impacted on by an individual’s confidence 
and awareness of these particular processes. Therefore, if an individual has 
decreased confidence and awareness of critical abilities such as emotion recognition, 
this results in a reduction in the capacity to process emotional information 
accordingly, consequently evidencing emotional deficits such as reduced empathy 
(Hudlika, 2008). If an individual was aware of their emotion recognition ability 
being reduced, this could allow compensatory processes to come into action and a 
more conscious effort may occur to improve emotional deficits.  
No research to our knowledge has examined the impact of metacognitive 
ability on emotion recognition when a part of the alexithymic traits-empathy 
relationship. However, some studies provide support for the likely role of 
metacognition in this relationship indirectly. In recent research with a sample of 
individuals with diagnosed schizophrenia, a disorder highly co-morbid with 
alexithymic traits, metacognition was related to, and had a trending relationship with 
cognitive empathy and affective empathy, respectively (Bonfils, Lysaker, Minor, & 
Salvers, 2017). Other studies have found relationships between metacognition and 
empathy. For example, WeiMing, Lysaker and Kai (2015) found positive 
correlations between overall metacognition scores and both cognitive and affective 
empathy. These studies however, only examined global metacognitive functioning or 
measures of metacognitive strategies, rather than metacognitive functioning in 
relation to a particular ability. By examining a specific metacognition in relation to a 
specific ability, we can gain a better understanding of whether changing 
metacognitive awareness of that ability can facilitate adjusted responses. The current 
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study proposes that metacognitive ability may impact on the relationship between 
alexithymic traits and empathy, through its impact on emotion recognition ability. 
The Current Study  
  Inspecting the relationship between alexithymic traits and empathy, and the 
impact of emotion recognition, conditional of metacognitive functioning, is of great 
importance and thus is an important aim of this study. Although the present study is 
preliminary in nature and is with a non-clinical sample, if emotion recognition and 
metacognitive ability influences the relationship between alexithymic traits and 
empathy, this would act as a starting point for future research in a clinical population 
in order to guide targeted treatment for those experiencing difficulties with 
alexithymia and empathy.  
Accordingly, this study aims to provide further support for the relationship 
between alexithymic traits and empathy, and the respective cognitive and affective 
dimensions of these constructs. In addition, this study will examine whether emotion 
recognition ability, when moderated by metacognitive ability, would influence the 
strength and/or direction of the relationship between alexithymic traits and empathy. 
This research will focus on the negative valence emotions of anger, fear, and 
sadness, as an inability to detect these emotions has more severe social and 
interpersonal consequences due to their association with vulnerability and threat 
(Berthoz et al., 2002). 
It is hypothesised that there will be a negative relationship between affective 
alexithymic traits and affective empathy, such that the reduced ability to identify and 
describe feelings in oneself, would lead to a reduced ability to feel emotions another 
person is feeling. Secondly, it is predicted that there will be a significant negative 
relationship between cognitive alexithymic traits and cognitive empathy, such that 
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high levels of a concrete, externally oriented thinking style will result in a reduced 
ability to understand another's emotional state. For the cognitive, and affective 
models, it is predicted that emotion recognition, when moderated by metacognitive 
ability, would partially mediate the relationship between alexithymic traits and 
empathy. This effect is only proposed to occur for low levels of metacognitive 
ability, not for mean or high levels. Based on the suggestion that the cognitive 
dimension of alexithymia is associated with deficits in recognising and 
understanding the emotions of others (Demers & Koven, 2015), and metacognition is 
more of a cognitive, rather than effective process (Bonfils, Lysaker, Minor, & 
Salvers, 2017), it is expected that the moderated mediation effects would be stronger 
for the cognitive models.  
Method 
Participants   
 
Participants consisted of 120 individuals between the ages of the ages of 18 
and 55 years (M = 24.95, SD = 7.19) who were either students at the University of 
Tasmania, or members of the wider Northern Tasmanian community. There were 52 
males (M = 24.90, SD = 6.28) and 68 females (M = 25.00, SD = 7.85). First year 
Psychology students were recruited via SONA, a secure online electronic platform, 
and through the delivery of presentations to classes. Further recruitment involved 
advertisements in the form of flyers displayed throughout the University of 
Tasmania’s Newnham campus and the wider Northern Tasmanian community. First 
year Psychology students were awarded 45 minutes course credit for participation, 
and other participants went into the draw to receive one of three double movie 
vouchers.  
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Exclusion criteria included those without normal or corrected to normal 
vision, severe depression (scores over 28 on the depression scale of the DASS-21), a 
history of any neurological condition, and pregnancy. One-hundred and thirty-five 
individuals completed the screening questionnaire, however nine were excluded 
based on the exclusion criteria, and six did not respond following the initial pre-
screening. Individuals with severe depression and/or anxiety scores were provided 
with information on the University of Tasmania on-campus counselling services.   
An a-priori power analysis using G*power 3.1.9.2 (Faul et al., 2007) was 
conducted to determine the minimum sample size needed to detect significant 
effects. In a study examining emotion recognition ability, alexithymic traits, mood 
and empathy by Lyvers et al., (2018) an effect size of R2 =. 18 was produced. Based 
on this effect size, an alpha of .05, and power of .90, it was suggested that at least 69 
participants would be needed for the present study. The present study however aimed 
to collect data from 120 participants to ensure a more robust analysis. 
Primary Measures 
 Toronto Alexithymia Scale-20 (TAS-20; Bagby et al., 1994; Appendix A). 
The TAS-20 is 20-item self-report questionnaire used to assess levels of alexithymic 
traits across three sub-scales: Difficulty Identifying Feelings (DIF, seven items,  e.g., 
‘I am often confused about what emotion I am feeling’); Difficulty Describing 
Feelings (DDF, five items, e.g., ‘I am able to describe my feelings easily’); and 
Externally Oriented Thinking (EOT, eight items, e.g., ‘I prefer to analyse problems 
rather than just describe them’). Each item is rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 
= ‘strongly agree’ to 5 = ‘strongly disagree’) where items are summed to arrive at a 
total score (20-100), and scores for each sub-scale. Higher scores indicate greater 
levels of alexithymic traits. The TAS-20 is regarded as the gold standard 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ALEXITHYMIA AND EMPATHY  
 
20 
  
measurement of alexithymia and its three-factor structure has been confirmed in both 
clinical and non-clinical samples in 19 countries (Taylor et al., 2003). In non-clinical 
populations, the TAS-20 has good internal reliability (! = 0.80), with all three 
subscales revealing acceptable reliability (DIF ! = 0.78, DDF ! = 0.73, and EOT ! 
= 0.64; Parker, Bagby, Taylor, Endler & Schmitz, 1993).   
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980; Appendix B). The IRI is 
a 28-item self-report measure, assessing both the cognitive and affective dimensions 
of empathy across four sub-scales. Empathetic Concern (EC) and Personal Distress 
(PD) are affective measures assessing feelings of sympathy (e.g., ‘I often have 
tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me’), and the tendency to 
experience distress in response to others distress (e.g., ‘Being in a tense emotional 
situation scares me’), respectively. Perspective Taking (PT) and Fantasy (FS) are 
cognitive measures assessing the ability to take the perspective of others (e.g., ‘I 
sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from 
their perspective’), and the tendency to transpose one’s self into fictional situations 
(e.g., ‘When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if 
the events in the story were happening to me’), respectively. Each item is rated on a 
5-point Likert-type scale (e.g., ‘A = Does not describe me well’, to ‘E = Describes 
me very well’), with seven items for each sub-scale. There are 9 negatively worded 
items (3, 4, 7, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18 & 19), which are reversed scored. The possible 
range of scores for each subscale is 0-28, with higher scores indicating greater levels 
of empathic tendencies. The IRI demonstrates good construct validity as determined 
by factor analysis (Delic et al., 2011), and acceptable test-retest reliability (r = .62) 
(Bernstein & Davis, 1982). The IRI has acceptable internal consistency reliability (! 
= .70) overall, and acceptable to good internal consistency reliability for the four 
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sub-scales (EC ! = .80, PD ! = .76, PT ! = .75, FS ! = .79) (Baldner & McGinley, 
2014).   
 Emotion Recognition Task (ERT; Montagne et al., 2007; Appendix C). The 
ERT is a computerised task that assesses an individual’s ability to identify six basic 
universal emotions (happiness, surprise, disgust, anger, fear, sadness). The task 
consists of 120 trials where each emotional expression is presented in a video clip on 
one of either two male or female Caucasian faces. The video clips are presented in a 
random, pre-determined order that increases in length, with each emotion being 
displayed four times at five intensity levels, beginning with a neutral face and 
morphing from lower to higher intensities (0-20%, 0-40%, 0-60%, 0-80%, and 0-
100%). Participant’s select the expression they perceived on each trial using an 
alternative forced-choice format of the six emotions. To ensure participants were 
familiar with the task, participants completed three practice trials, where assistance 
was provided if they did not understand the procedure. The ERT has been 
demonstrated to be valid in both non-clinical (Kessels, Montagne, Hendriks, Perrett, 
& de Haan, 2013), and clinical populations (Rosenberg, McDonald, Dethier, 
Kessels, & Westbrook, 2014).   
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Figure 1. The Emotion Recognition Task (ERT; Montagne et al., 2007). Picture 
shows gradually increasing intensity for the emotion of disgust. The actual test 
shows these frames morphing from a neutral expression in 10% increments to one of 
the five intensity levels (20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 100%).  
 Metacognition of emotion recognition ability was assessed by asking 
participants to give a verbal confidence rating of their performance in correctly 
identifying the emotional expression on each item of the ERT. Participants provided 
a figure from 0 – 100%, with 0% indicating not at all confident in their response and 
100% indicating extremely confident in their response.     
Secondary Measures                                                                                                            
 To further profile participants and gain useful information on the 
characteristics of the sample the following measures were used.  
Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale – 21 (DASS21; Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1995; Appendix D). The DASS-21 consists of three self-report scales (7 
items each) measuring levels of negative emotional state – depression (e.g., ‘I felt 
down-hearted and blue’), anxiety (e.g., ‘I felt scared without any good reason’) and 
stress (e.g., ‘I found it hard to wind down’) in the previous week. Responses are 
rated on a 4-point Likert-type scale (0 = ‘Did not apply to me at all’ to 3 = ‘Applied 
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to me very much, most of the time’). Scores for each subscale are created by 
summing items defining each sub-scale and multiplying by two according to 
manualised scoring instructions. The DASS-21 was included to examine mood as a 
possible covariate of the present study, in addition to characterising the sample. In 
both clinical and non-clinical samples, the DASS-21 has good validity (Crawford & 
Henry, 2003; Brown, Chorpita, Korotitsch, & Barlow, 1997), and excellent internal 
reliability for the depression (! = .82), anxiety (! = .90) and stress (! = .93) sub-
scales (Henry & Crawford, 2005).  
  Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSE; Rosenberg, 1965; Appendix E). The 
RSE is a 10-item measure assessing levels of positive (e.g., ‘I feel I have a number 
of good qualities’) and negative (e.g., ‘I feel I do not have much to be proud of”) 
feelings about the self. Participants rate items on a 4-point Likert-type scale (1 = 
‘strongly agree’ to 4 = ‘strongly disagree’). There are 5 items that are negatively 
worded (2, 5, 6, 8, & 9), which are reverse scored. Items are summed to arrive at a 
total score ranging from 0-40, with higher scores indicating higher self-esteem. As 
self-esteem has been identified to correlate negatively with alexithymia (Sasai, 
Tanaka, & Hishimoto, 2010), the RSES was included to examine current-self-esteem 
as a possible co variate, in addition to characterising the sample. The RSE is highly 
internally reliable (! = .88), as demonstrated by a large study involving 
undergraduate students (Gray-Little, Williams, & Hancock, 1997).         
Procedure                                              
 Ethical clearance (See appendix F) was obtained by the Tasmanian Social 
Sciences Human Research Committee (HREC: H0016480). Upon recruitment 
through SONA, presentations to classes, or flyers (Appendix G), participants read 
the participant information sheet (Appendix H) and completed a screening 
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questionnaire on Survey Monkey. The survey included demographic information 
(age, sex, ethnicity, marital status, highest level of educational attainment, and 
whether English was spoken as a first language), medical history relevant to 
eligibility, and the DASS-21. If eligible, a time for the experimental session was 
arranged. Following informed consent (Appendix I), participants completed the 
following questionnaires on a computer: the TAS-20, IRI, DASS-21, and RSE. 
Participants then completed the computerised ERT and verbally provided confidence 
ratings. Participants were then de-briefed, provided with the opportunity to ask 
questions, and thanked for their time.  
Design and Statistical Analyses 
A cross-sectional correlational design was employed. Correlational analyses 
and moderated mediation models were conducted on IBM SPSS Version 24. 
Correlational analyses were conducted to assess relationships between variables, and 
to identify possible co-variates for the six subsequent moderated mediation models 
(Please see appendix J for correlations of all variables). To adhere to the rule of 
parsimony and to ensure that there was no overfitting of the model, only co-variates 
that significantly predicted the outcome when a part of the model were included in 
the final analyses. This resulted in sex and anxiety being added as covariates for the 
affective models, and sex being added as a covariate for the cognitive models. All 
correlations were interpreted according to the guidelines of Cohen (1992) whereby 
.10 indicates a small effect, .30 a moderate effect and .50 a large effect.  
 Reliability analyses were conducted as item parcelling procedures were 
implemented, and to ensure the measures had adequate internal consistency 
reliability in the present sample. Item parcelling involved adding the relevant 
affective and cognitive items of the TAS-20 and IRI to create cognitive and affective 
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composite scores of both constructs. Cognitive alexithymic traits were represented 
by the EOT sub-scale of the TAS-20, and affective alexithymic traits were 
represented by combining the DIF and DDF sub-scales of the TAS-20. Cognitive 
empathy composite scores involved combining the FS and PT sub-scales of the IRI, 
and affective empathy composite scores involved combining the EC and PD sub-
scales of the IRI. Cronbach’s ! was used to index internal reliability for the 
combined items. Values were interpreted as follows: ! " 0.9 = excellent; 0.9 > ! " 
0.8 = good; 0.8 > ! " 0.7 = acceptable; 0.7 > ! " 0.6 = questionable; 0.6 > ! " 0.5 = 
poor; and 0.5 > ! = unacceptable (Gliem & Gliem, 2003).  
 Conditional process analysis models from Hayes (2013) PROCESS macro 
were used. Model 14 of Hayes’ PROCESS combines both moderation and 
mediation, linking the indirect effects to values of the moderator. This approach 
produces a formal test of the conditional indirect effect, known as the index of 
moderated mediation. Hayes (2018) suggests when testing whether an indirect effect 
is moderated, the index of moderated mediation and inspection of the confidence 
intervals not overlapping zero is the best statistical inference for a significant effect 
(Hayes, 2018). Although some researchers suggest some of the causal pathways need 
to be significant to infer mediation, Hayes (2018) suggests these relationships are not 
always needed. As the independent variables (affective alexithymic traits and 
cognitive alexithymic traits) were created from the same measurement (TAS-20) 
unstandardised beta (B) values will be reported. This is in line with Hayes (2018) 
suggestion that unstandardised beta values are more useful for ‘real world’ 
predictions. As the sampling distribution was not normal in the present study, 
bootstrapping procedures were conducted (Field, 2015). Based on Hayes (2018) 
suggestion that bias corrected-bootstrapping is better for statistical inference, 10,000 
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bias corrected bootstraps of the original data were used. Although bootstrapping 
eliminates the assumptions of normality, when testing conditional indirect effects, 
linearity and independence of observations need to be satisfied. Scatterplots 
confirmed linear relationships, and participants only took part once, therefore these 
assumptions were satisfied.   
  Model 14 tests the conditional effect of X on Y, through M, as a linear 
function of V. This is a second stage moderated mediation whereby the strength 
and/or direction of the relationship between the mediator and the outcome, is 
impacted on by the moderator. For all moderated mediation models in the current 
study, the predictor variable (X) was alexithymic traits (cognitive or affective); the 
outcome variable (Y) was empathy (cognitive or affective); the mediator variable 
(M) was emotion recognition ability; and the moderator variable (V) was 
metacognitive ability. There was a total of six moderated mediation models tested, 
three affective, and three cognitive, for each of the negative valence emotions of 
anger, fear and sadness. The conceptual model is presented in Figure 2. The 
statistical model presented in Figure 3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Conceptual Model 14 of PROCESS (Hayes, 2018). 
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Figure 3. Statistical Model 14 of PROCESS (Hayes, 2018).  
 
  Metacognitive ability. Calibration analyses measure the degree of fit 
between an individual’s judgement of performance and their actual performance on a 
task (Bol & Hacker, 2012). In this study, calibration will be assessed using the 
Adjusted Normalised Discrimination index (ANDI). ANDI is an index that evaluates 
resolution – the degree to which an individual’s confidence ratings can discriminate 
between correct and incorrect responses (Palmer et el., 2013; Vredeveldt & Sauer, 
2015). The ANDI statistic gives a value ranging from 0 (no resolution) to 1 (perfect 
discrimination).  
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Results 
Descriptive Statistics. Descriptive statistics for all self-report measures, the ERT 
and metacognitive ability (ANDI) are presented in Table 1.  
Table 1 
 Descriptive Statistics for All Measures 
 M SD 
 
TAS-20  
  
 Affective Alexithymic Traits  29.82 8.34 
 Cognitive Alexithymic Traits 13.90 3.19 
IRI                 
 Affective Empathy 30.93 7.20 
 Cognitive Empathy 34.33 7.90 
ERT   
 Anger 15.76 2.84 
            Fear 6.32 3.51 
            Sadness  8.61 3.45 
ANDI     
            Anger 0.27 0.28 
            Fear 0.15 0.20 
            Sadness   0.17  0.20 
DASS-21 
 Depression  
 
6.96 
 
7.25 
 Anxiety 5.31 6.62 
 Stress 11.63 8.24 
   
RSES 
  
7.90 
  
1.30 
  
Note. TAS-20 = Toronto Alexithymia Scale, IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index, 
ERT = Emotion Recognition Task, ANDI = ANDI Statistic (metacognitive ability), 
DASS-21 = Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale, RSES = Rosenberg Self-Esteem 
Scale 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ALEXITHYMIA AND EMPATHY  
 
29 
  
Reliability Analyses  
 
 Internal reliability was acceptable-to-good for cognitive empathy (!= .79), 
affective empathy (!= .78), and affective alexithymic traits (!= .87). Cognitive 
alexithymic traits (!= .61) indicated questionable internal consistency reliability, 
however some authors suggest an alpha value over .60 is adequate (Butts & 
Michaels, 2006). Inspection of item reliability statistics revealed item deletion would 
not improve any of the four reliability values. Refer to appendix K for Cronbachs α 
values of all self-report measures used in this study.   
Moderated Mediation Analyses  
  Affective Models. All affective models demonstrated no significant direct, 
or indirect effects, after controlling for sex and anxiety. The model for anger is 
summarised in Figure 4, the model for fear is summarised in Figure 5, the model for 
sadness is summarised in Figure 6. A full write up of all the affective models is 
presented in Appendix L. A summary of all the affective and cognitive moderated 
mediation models is provided in Table 3, and a summary of the conditional indirect 
effects for all models is presented in Table 4. 
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Indirect effect: a1b3 pathway; B = .02, 95%BCI [-.20, .19]. 
 
Figure 4. The conditional indirect effect of affective alexithymic traits on affective 
empathy through emotion recognition ability for anger as a function of 
metacognitive ability. Both sex (B = 7.33 SE = 1.12, 95%CI [5.13, 9.55], p < .001) 
and anxiety (B = .26, SE = .09, 95%CI [0.07, 0.44], p = .006) significantly predicted 
cognitive empathy. Note. ER = Emotion Recognition. MC = Metacognitive Ability. 
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Indirect effect: a1b3 pathway; B = .001, 95%BCI [-.09, .10]. 
 
Figure 5. The conditional indirect effect of affective alexithymic traits, on affective 
empathy through emotion recognition ability for fear, as a function of metacognitive 
ability. Both sex (B = 7.33 SE = 1.11, 95%BCI [5.14, 9.52], p < .001) and anxiety (B 
= .25 SE = .09, 95%BCI [0.07, 0.43], p = .008) significantly predicted cognitive 
empathy. Note. ER = Emotion Recognition. MC = Metacognitive Ability.  
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Indirect effect: a1b3 pathway; B = .007, SE = .048, 95%BCI [-.05, .17]. 
 
Figure 5. The conditional indirect effect of affective alexithymic traits, on affective 
empathy through emotion recognition ability for sadness, as a function of 
metacognitive. Both sex (B = 6.72, SE = 1.10, 95%BCI [4.54, 8.90], p < .001) and 
anxiety (B = .24 SE = .09, 95%BCI [0.06, 0.42], p = .008) significantly predicted 
cognitive empathy. Note. ER = Emotion Recognition. MC = Metacognitive Ability 
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Cognitive Models  
 
 Anger. Figure 7 shows the conditional indirect effect of cognitive 
alexithymic traits, on cognitive empathy through emotion recognition ability (anger), 
as a function of metacognitive ability. Both emotion recognition ability (b1 pathway; 
B = -.07, SE = .31, 95%CI [-.68, .54], p = .821) and metacognitive ability (b2 
pathway; B = .95, SE = 15.98, 95%CI [-30.71, 32.61], p = .953) did not significantly 
predict cognitive empathy. No significant interaction effect of emotion recognition 
ability and metacognitive ability, on cognitive empathy was found (b3 pathway; B = 
.09, SE = .93, 95%CI [-1.76, 1.94], p = .925.  Sex significantly predicted cognitive 
empathy (B = 3.90, SE = 1.31, 95%CI [1.30, 6.50], p = .004). The direct effect of 
cognitive alexithymic traits on cognitive empathy was significant (c’ pathway; B = -
.98, SE = .20, 95%CI [-1.38, -0.57], p < .001). The hypothesised conditional indirect 
effect of cognitive alexithymic traits on cognitive empathy through emotion 
recognition ability, as a function of growth orientation was non-significant, a1b3 
pathway; B = - .00, SE = .08, 95%CI [-.21, .14]. Conditional indirect effects revealed 
that at high, mean and low levels of metacognitive ability, emotion recognition 
ability was not significantly related to cognitive empathy, as the bootstrapped 95% 
confidence intervals all contained zero.   
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Indirect effect: a1b3 pathway; B = - .00, 95%BCI [-.21, .14] 
  
Figure 6. The conditional indirect effect of affective alexithymic traits on affective                  
empathy through emotion recognition ability for anger, as a function of 
metacognitive ability. Note. ER = Emotion Recognition. MC = Metacognitive 
Ability. 
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Fear. Figure 8 shows the conditional indirect effect of cognitive alexithymic traits, 
on cognitive empathy through emotion recognition ability (fear), as a function of 
metacognitive ability. Both emotion recognition ability (b1 pathway; B = -.11, SE = 
.22, 95%CI [-.55, .34], p = .638) and metacognitive ability (b2 pathway; B = 3.71, SE 
= 4.90, 95%CI [-6.00, 13.41], p = .451) did not significantly predict cognitive 
empathy. No significant interaction effect of emotion recognition ability and 
metacognitive ability, on cognitive empathy was found (b3 pathway; B = .74, SE = 
.81, 95%CI [- .86, 2.34], p = .361. Sex significantly predicted cognitive empathy (B 
= 4.22, SE = 1.26, 95%CI [1.72, 6.73], p = .001). The direct effect of cognitive 
alexithymic traits on cognitive empathy was significant (c’ pathway; B = -1.05, SE = 
.20, 95%CI [-1.45, -0.66], p < .001). The hypothesised conditional indirect effect of 
cognitive alexithymic traits on cognitive empathy through emotion recognition 
ability, as a function of metacognitive ability was non-significant, a1b3 pathway; B = 
-.18, SE = .27, 95%BCI [-.74, .27]. Conditional indirect effects revealed that at high, 
mean and low levels of metacognitive ability, emotion recognition ability was not 
significantly related to cognitive empathy, as the bootstrapped 95% confidence 
intervals all contained zero.   
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Indirect effect: a1b3 pathway; B = -.18, 95%BCI [-.74, .27]. 
 
Figure 7. The conditional indirect effect of affective alexithymic traits on affective                  
empathy through emotion recognition ability for fear, as a function of metacognitive 
ability. Note. ER = Emotion Recognition. MC = Metacognitive Ability.
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 Sadness. Figure 9 shows the conditional indirect effect of cognitive 
alexithymic traits, on cognitive empathy through emotion recognition ability (sad), 
as a function of metacognitive ability. Both emotion recognition ability (b1 pathway; 
B = -.46, SE = .25, 95%CI [-.03, .95], p = .067) and metacognitive ability (b2 
pathway; B = 11.56, SE = 7.07, 95%CI [-2.46, 25.58], p = .105) did not significantly 
predict cognitive empathy. No significant interaction effect of emotion recognition 
ability and metacognitive ability, on cognitive empathy was found (b3 pathway; B = - 
1.14, SE = .72, 95%CI [- 2.57, .29], p = .116. Sex significantly predicted cognitive 
empathy (B = 3.50, SE = 1.30, 95%CI [.93, 6.07], p = .008). The direct effect of 
cognitive alexithymic traits on cognitive empathy was significant (c’ pathway; B = - 
.96, SE = .20, 95%CI [-1.36, -0.56], p < .001). The hypothesised conditional indirect 
effect of cognitive alexithymic traits on cognitive empathy through emotion 
recognition ability, as a function of growth orientation was significant, a1b3 pathway; 
B = .26, SE = .17, 95%BCI [.01, .72]. Conditional indirect effects revealed that at 
high, and mean levels of metacognitive ability, emotion recognition ability was not 
significantly related to cognitive empathy, as the bootstrapped 95% confidence 
intervals both contained zero. However, at low levels of metacognitive ability, 
emotion recognition ability was negatively and significantly related to cognitive 
empathy, as the bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals did not contain zero, B = -
.10, 95%BCI [-.29, -.01]. This moderated mediation effect demonstrates that 
individuals with higher levels of cognitive alexithymic traits, have reduced emotion 
recognition ability (sadness), which in turn results in reduced cognitive empathy, but 
only for those with low levels of metacognitive ability.  
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Indirect effect: a1b3 pathway; B = .26, 95%BCI [.01, .72]. 
 
Figure 8. The conditional indirect effect of affective alexithymic traits on affective                  
empathy through emotion recognition ability for sadness, as a function of 
metacognitive ability. Note. ER = Emotion Recognition. MC = Metacognitive 
Ability. 
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Table 2  
Summary of the Six Moderated Mediation Models. Each Model Explored the Relationship Between Alexithymic Traits (Cognitive or       
Affective) and Empathy (Cognitive or Affective), Through Emotion Recognition Ability as a Function of Metacognitive Ability. 
  Note. B = unstandardised beta, r = zero-order correlation, r2 = zero-order correlation squared, MSE = mean square error, SE = standard error.  
 
                    
 
Model  
 
B 
 
SE 
 
95%CI 
 
p 
  
   B 
 
SE 
  
95% CI 
  
r 
 
r2 
 
MSE 
 
F 
 
p 
 
Affective-Anger 
 
.09 
 
.07 
 
[-.05, .24] 
 
.203 
  
.022 
 
.04 
 
[-.03, .19] 
  
.602 
 
.363 
 
34.74 
 
10.72 
 
<.001 
 
Affective-Fear 
 
.08 
 
.07 
 
[-.06, .22] 
 
.271 
  
.001 
 
.05 
 
  [-.10, .11] 
  
.603 
 
.364 
 
34.69 
 
10.77 
 
<.001 
 
Affective-Sad 
 
.10 
 
.07 
 
[-.04, .24] 
 
.171 
  
.007 
 
.04 
 
[-.05, .17] 
  
.620 
 
.384 
 
33.57 
 
11.77 
 
<.001 
 
Cognitive-
Anger 
 
-.98 
 
.20 
 
[-1.38, -.57] 
 
<.001 
  
.002 
 
.08 
 
[-.21, .14] 
  
.527 
 
.278 
 
47.11 
 
8.76 
 
<.001 
 
Cognitive-Fear 
 
-1.05 
 
.20 
 
[-1.45, -0.66] 
 
<.001 
  
-.180 
 
.27 
 
[-.74, .27] 
  
.569 
 
.312 
 
44.87 
 
10.34 
 
<.001 
 
Cognitive-Sad  
 
-.96 
 
.20 
 
[-1.36, .56] 
 
<.001 
  
.246 
 
.17 
 
[.01, .72] 
  
.547 
 
.299 
 
45.72 
 
9.71 
 
<.001 
Direct Effect c’ Indirect Effect – Index of Moderated Mediation a1b3 Model Summary (Outcome – Empathy)
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Table 3  
Summary of the Conditional Indirect Effects (M (±) SD) for all Six Moderated Mediation Models.  
Note. Bootstrapped sample size = 10,000. SE B = Bootstrapped SE, B = unstandardised beta, 95%BCA CI = Bootstrapped Confidence Intervals. 
MC Value = Metacognition Value. One SD below the mean was replaced with the minimum because one SD below the mean is outside of the 
range of the data.  
  
 
                 
 
Model 
 
MC 
Value 
 
B 
 
SE 
B 
 
95%BCA 
CI  
  
MC 
Value 
 
B 
 
B 
SE 
  
95% BCA 
CI 
  
MC 
Value 
 
B 
 
SE 
B 
 
95%BCA 
CI 
 
Affective-Anger 
 
.000 
 
-.00 
 
.01 
 
[.45, .01] 
  
.272 
 
.00 
 
.01 
 
[-.08, .04] 
  
.552 
 
.01 
 
.02 
 
[-.01, .08] 
 
Affective-Fear 
 
.000 
 
-.00 
 
.01 
 
[-.02, .01]  
  
.154 
 
-.00 
   
.01 
 
[-.02, .01] 
    
.363 
 
-.00 
 
.01 
 
[-.03, .02] 
 
Affective-Sad 
  
.000 
 
-.00 
 
.02 
 
[-.05, .03] 
  
.165 
 
-.00 
 
.01 
 
[-.04, .02] 
  
.370 
 
-.00 
 
.01 
 
[-.03, .01] 
 
Cognitive-
Anger 
 
.000 
 
.00 
 
.03 
 
[-.43, .07] 
  
.272 
 
.00 
 
.03 
 
[-.04, .06] 
  
.552 
 
.00 
 
.04 
 
[-.07, .09] 
 
Cognitive-Fear 
 
.000 
 
.03 
 
.07 
 
[-.08, .20] 
    
.154 
 
-.00 
 
.06 
  
[-.12, .11] 
  
.363 
 
.04 
 
.09 
 
[-.23, .10] 
 
Cognitive-Sad  
 
.000 
 
-.10 
 
.07 
 
[-.29, -.01] 
  
.165 
 
-.06 
 
.05 
 
[-.20, .01] 
  
.370 
 
-.01 
 
.05 
 
[-.12, .08] 
-1SD  Mean +1SD 
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Discussion 
 
The present study utilised conditional process analyses to explore the 
relationship between alexithymic traits and empathy, and factors which may underlie 
this relationship. The first aim of the present study was to add further support to the 
vast literature demonstrating a relationship between alexithymic traits and empathy, 
and their cognitive and affective dimensions. Secondly, in the absence of studies 
which have sought to determine factors underlying the relationship between 
alexithymic traits and empathy, the present study investigated whether emotion 
recognition and metacognitive ability would be mechanisms underlying the interplay 
between alexithymic traits and empathy. It was predicted that the relationship 
between alexithymic traits and empathy, would be partially mediated by emotion 
recognition, conditional of low levels of metacognitive ability.  
 The first hypothesis, that there would be a significant negative relationship 
between affective alexithymic traits and affective empathy, was not supported. No 
relationship between the ability to identify and describe feelings in one self, and the 
ability to feel emotions another person is feeling was detected in this study. This 
finding is inconsistent with previous findings by Guttman and Laporte (2002) and 
Grynberg et al. (2012) who showed significant negative relationships between the 
DIF and DDF sub scales of the TAS-20 (affective alexithymic traits) and the PD and 
EC sub scales of the IRI (affective empathy).  The Self-to-Other Model of Empathy 
(2014) suggests that in individuals with alexithymic traits there is a disruption in the 
affective representation system, whereby they have difficulties interpreting and 
representing affective states in themselves. As a result, learning how to represent 
affective states of another is difficult, resulting in empathetic difficulties (Bird & 
Viding, 2014). In line with this model, the absence of significant effects may due to 
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the present studies non-clinical sample having low-to-moderate levels of alexithymic 
traits. Thus, there may not have been a significant disruption in the affective 
representation system, and the ability to be empathetic was not reduced, to the extent 
that was anticipated. Furthermore, given the sample may be considered ‘healthy’, it 
is possible compensatory mechanisms may have prevented this negative relationship 
from occurring. For example, a healthy individual may be aware that they have 
difficulties in identifying and describing feelings in one self, therefore they put more 
conscious effort into being empathetic towards another.  
 The second hypothesis that there will be a significant negative relationship 
between cognitive alexithymic traits and cognitive empathy was supported by all 
three cognitive models (anger, fear, sadness). For all models, where there was an 
increase in an externally oriented, practical, concrete style of thinking, there was a 
significant reduction in the ability to recognise and understand another’s emotional 
state. These findings further substantiate research demonstrating the EOT (cognitive) 
sub scale of the TAS-20 to be related to the PD and FS (cognitive) sub scales of the 
IRI (Grynberg, 2012; Guttman & Laporte, 2002). This specific finding is consistent 
with the shared networks model (2012), suggesting that as alexithymia and empathy 
share some of the same key neural regions (ACC, insula, striatum) a disruption in 
these areas is likely to affect both constructs. In relation to this notion, several 
studies have determined that both cognitive alexithymia and cognitive empathy are 
implicated by abnormal functioning in the insula cortex (Gu, Hof, Friston, & Fan, 
2013).The insular cortex, particularly its most anterior portion, is involved in 
emotional experience in one’s self, in addition to the understanding of another’s 
emotional state (i.e., cognitive empathy; Singer, Critchely, Preuschoff, 2009). The 
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relationship between cognitive alexithymic traits and cognitive empathy in the 
present study may therefore be due to atypical activity within the insular cortex.   
This study is the first to explore the impact of emotion recognition and 
metacognitive ability on the relationship between alexithymic traits and empathy. 
Real world interactions are dependent on the ability of an individual to recognise 
accuracies and inaccuracies, and to use this knowledge to inform the processes of 
recognising and interpreting emotions (Kelly & Metcalfe, 2011). Evaluating emotion 
recognition ability as well as metacognitive functioning together increases the 
ecological validity of the study, as it allows a more accurate representation of 
emotion recognition in everyday interactions (Honan, Skromanis, Johnson, & Palmer 
2017). For example, if you perceive someone which seems isolated in a social 
environment, if you are aware that your ability to recognise their emotion is reduced, 
you may then look for other social and environmental cues which can provide insight 
into how they are feeling (e.g., you may realise an individual is sad as their car tire is 
flat). The ability to monitor and reflect on your emotion recognition performance has 
numerous implications. These include improving emotion recognition ability and 
compensating for difficulties, promoting learning, and ensuring flexibility in social 
interactions (Hudlika, 2005; Kelly & Metcalfe, 2011). Consequently, this can assist 
in the ability to respond appropriately in social interactions, thereby strengthening 
relationships with others (Kelly & Metcalfe, 2011).  
 In examining the mechanisms by which alexithymic traits might relate to 
empathy, moderated mediation effects were evident. The model for sadness when 
controlling for sex showed a significant moderated mediation effect. This 
demonstrated that an increase in an externally oriented, practical style of thinking, 
resulted in a reduction in the ability to recognise sadness, which in turn reduced the 
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ability to understand another’s emotional state, but only for those with low levels of 
metacognitive ability. As expected this effect was only demonstrated for low levels 
of metacognitive ability, not for mean or high levels. This indicates that if you have 
greater awareness of your emotion recognition performance, your emotion 
recognition ability would not have a significant impact on the relationship between 
cognitive alexithymic traits and cognitive empathy. This finding extends upon the 
research by Lyvers et al., (2018) which demonstrated that the negative relationship 
between the externally oriented thinking sub scale of the TAS-20 and cognitive 
empathy was partially mediated by impaired emotion recognition. This result also 
aligns with the suggestion by Demers and Koven (2015) that deficits in facial 
emotion recognition and cognitive empathy may reflect underlying deficits in 
metacognition associated with alexithymia. This was the first study to support this 
notion by demonstrating metacognitive functioning, through its impact on emotion 
recognition, to influence the relationship between cognitive alexithymic traits and 
cognitive empathy. No moderated mediation effects were displayed for the fear and 
anger models, however trending effects were evident. This finding may be due to the 
emotional state of sadness having more of an association with empathy (Eisenberg & 
Fabes, 1990), in comparison to anger and fear which are often related to threat 
(Berthoz et al., 2002). With a more clinical sample where the deficits are more 
pronounced, it is expected that effects for the anger and fear models may emerge.  
 For the affective models, when controlling for anxiety and sex no moderated 
mediation effects were present for any of the three models. These non-significant 
conditional indirect effects may be firstly due to the low-moderate levels of 
alexithymic traits within the sample, and also due to the healthy population which 
may have compensatory processes to inhibit this anticipated effect occurring. Prior 
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studies demonstrating a relationship between affective alexithymic traits and 
affective empathy used samples with an even distribution of alexithymia scores, 
containing participants with high or even clinical levels (> 61 on the TAS-20) of 
alexithymic traits (Kano et al., 2003; Moriguchi et al., 2007). Through revisiting the 
definition of metacognition, which is ability to think about and integrate one’s own 
mental experiences and those of others, this is more akin to cognitive than affective 
empathy (Lysaker, et al., 2013; Semerari et al., 2003). In addition, emotion 
recognition is suggested to be more of a cognitive, rather than affective process 
(Bonfils et al., 2017). Therefore, despite this preliminary investigation being of 
importance, it is possible that emotion recognition ability and metacognitive ability 
may not impact on the relationship between affective alexithymic traits and affective 
empathy. This encourages the exploration of other factors which may be impacting 
on this relationship.            
Limitations and Future Directions                          
Future research needs to consider the role of sex as a possible moderating 
variable in the relationship between alexithymic traits and empathy. For both the 
affective and cognitive models, sex had a large relationship with empathy and it 
positively predicted empathy (both cognitive and affective) when apart of each 
model. It is frequently cited that females are more astute in a range of social-
emotional functions than males (Hoffman, 1977), demonstrating greater functioning 
in abilities such as empathy, and theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, & Wheelwright, 
2004). On the contrary, males have been shown to display higher levels of 
alexithymic traits than females in prior research (Parker, Taylor, & Bagby, 1993; 
Grynberg, Luminet, Corneille, Grezes, & Berthoz, 2010). This male bias for 
alexithymia is suggested to be due to socialisation processes which reinforce that 
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males should not openly exhibit feelings and suppress feelings of vulnerability and 
tenderness (Levant et al., 2006; Kerakais, & Levant, 2012). Due to these findings, 
the impact of sex differences needs to be examined in future research.  
There are a few noteworthy considerations pertaining to the materials of the 
present study. Although the ERT is more ecologically valid than tasks using static 
images (Montagne, Kessels, Haan, Perret, 2007), it has various limitations. Several 
emotion researchers suggest that emotions consist of various elements such as body 
language, tone, and posture, which are dependent on the social and environmental 
context in which they occur (Averill, 1988; Parkinson, 1998; Christophe & Rimé, 
1997). In addition, Fridlund (1994) suggests emotions evolve in response to 
selection pressures (external agents affecting an organisms ability to survive) within 
the environment, and others responsivity towards them influences this process. 
Therefore, the ERT may not provide an accurate representation of real world 
performance due to it not including additional emotional cues, social and 
environmental context, and due to the faces merging from neutral facial expressions. 
As such it would be beneficial for future research to utilise emotion recognition 
assessments which display real life interactions such as The Awareness of Social 
Inference Test -  Emotion Perception subtest (TASIT; Honan, McDonald, Sufani, 
Hine, & Kumfor, 2016) or the Complex Audio-Visual Emotion Assessment Task 
(CAVEAT; Rosenberg, McDonald, Rosenberg, & Westbrook, 2016). These 
measures have both been demonstrated to be ecologically valid and highly reliable 
(McDonald, Flanagan, Martin, & Saunders, 2004; Vellante et al., 2013). In addition, 
although the TAS-20 is currently the gold-standard measurement for alexithymia, as 
the labelling and describing of emotions is difficult for individuals with alexithymic 
traits, the accuracy of self-report judgements has been questioned (Lane, Sechrest, 
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Reidel, Weldon, Kaszniak, & Scwartz, 1996). Therefore, future research would be of 
benefit to utilise observer-rated measures of alexithymic traits such as the Toronto 
Structured Interview for Alexithymia (TSIA; Bagby, Taylor, Parker, & Dickens, 
2006) or the Observer Alexithymia Scale (Haviland, Warren & Riggs, 2000), in 
conjunction with the TAS-20. These measures may be useful in identifying 
individuals with high-severe levels of alexithymic traits.  
 As the current study was only preliminary in nature and was conducted in a 
non-clinical sample, future research needs to be conducted within a clinical sample 
in order to make inferences about the clinical implications of this study. Although 
the present findings are the first of its kind and could be a useful starting point for 
future clinical research, it is important to not generalise the results of the present 
study to clinical populations. Furthermore, as this study only examined the 
relationships between alexithymic traits and empathy in a cross-sectional design, 
causality cannot be inferred based on the results.  
Theoretical Implications 
 
            There are several theoretical implications from the present study. Firstly, as a 
significant negative relationship between cognitive alexithymic traits and cognitive 
empathy was identified, this suggests that an individual’s thinking style may 
partially account for the empathy deficits seen in alexithymic individuals. When 
outlining the Self-to-Other Model of Empathy (2014) to explain the relationship 
between alexithymic traits and empathy, Bird and Viding (2014) focused primarily 
on the affective representation system, providing little indication to the extent that 
cognitive processes would impact on the ability to be empathetic. Taking the 
cognitive dimensions of alexithymia and empathy into account within the model may 
prove useful when applying it to future research. Of particular importance, and 
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interest in the present study was the finding that emotion recognition, conditional of 
low levels of metacognitive ability, mediated the relationship between cognitive 
alexithymic traits and cognitive empathy. This was only the second study to our 
knowledge to provide support for Bird and Vidings (2014) suggestion that emotion 
recognition is likely to be an intermediary sequence in the Self-to-Other Model of 
Empathy (Bird & Viding, 2014). Upon further replication of these findings, 
incorporating emotion recognition into the Self-to-Other Model of Empathy (Bird & 
Viding, 2014) may prove useful in clarifying the complex relationship between 
alexithymic traits and empathy. 
Practical Implications                                                                      
Given this present research was conducted in a non-clinical sample, practical 
implications in terms of therapeutic interventions cannot be substantiated. However, 
they may suggest what is likely to occur in a clinical sample and thus may have 
important clinical implications. As previously mentioned, alexithymic traits are 
highly co-morbid with a wide range of clinical disorders such as schizophrenia, 
autism spectrum disorder, anxiety disorders, somatoform disorders, eating disorders, 
depressive disorders, personality disorders, substance use disorders, post-traumatic 
stress disorder, and sexual disorders (Cochrane et al., 1993; Duddu et al., 2003; 
Fukunishi et al., 1997; Michetti et al., 2006; Thorberg et al., 2009; Van’t Wout et al., 
2007). As alexithymia is a trans-diagnostic precursor to empathy abnormalities, 
meaning across multiple disorders the effects of alexithymic traits on empathy are 
present (Bird et al., 2010), this emphasises the importance of targeted interventions.  
Metacognitive therapy based on Wells and Matthews Information Processing 
Model (1996) has been shown to be effective in reducing symptomology of a wide 
range of clinical disorders. Vanhelue, Verhaege, and Desmet (2011) suggest that 
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from clinical observations and controlled studies the treatment of alexithymic traits 
and the associated emotional deficiencies are often difficult. Therefore, perhaps 
targeting metacognitive awareness of emotion recognition performance, may 
improve the empathy deficits seen in alexithymic individuals. Future research 
however is needed in a clinical population. This is of great importance as addressing 
the empathy deficits in alexithymic individuals may have a positive impact on social 
functioning and the quality of interpersonal relationships (Hofelich & Preston, 
2012).               
Summary and Conclusion                                                                                                      
Alexithymic traits have been consistently demonstrated to be associated with 
difficulties in interpersonal relationships and social functioning. This has suggested 
to be due to the reduced levels of empathy seen in individuals with alexithymic 
traits, however factors underling this relationship are not at present understood. 
While this study found negative relationships between cognitive alexithymic traits 
and cognitive empathy, there was no such relationship between affective alexithymic 
traits and affective empathy. Of particular importance was the moderated mediation 
effect demonstrated for the cognitive model of sadness. Further studies in a clinical 
sample may generate highly important clinical implications for this effect. Targeting 
metacognitive awareness of emotion recognition performance may be a useful 
clinical intervention to help improve empathy deficits seen in those with alexithymic 
traits.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Toronto Alexithymia Scale 
TAS-20 
 
For each statement, please indicate how well it describes you by choosing the 
appropriate number on the scale at the top of the page: 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5. Please circle 
your answer to each statement. Answer as honestly as you can about how you are 
generally, there are no right or wrong answers.  
 
 
1. I am often confused about what emotion I am feeling 1      2      3      4      5 
2. It is difficult for me to find the right words for my feelings 1      2      3      4      5 
3. I have physical sensations that even doctors don’t understand 1      2      3      4      5 
4. I am able to describe my feelings easily 1      2      3      4      5 
5. I prefer to analyse problems rather than just describe them 1      2      3      4      5 
6. When I am upset, I don’t know if I am sad, frightened, or angry 1      2      3      4      5 
7. I am often puzzled by sensations in my body 1      2      3      4      5 
8. I prefer to just let things happen rather than to understand  
why they turned out that way 
1      2      3      4      5 
9. I have feelings that I can’t quite identify 1      2      3      4      5 
10. Being in touch with emotions is essential 1      2      3      4      5 
11. I find it hard to describe how I feel about people 1      2      3      4      5 
12. People tell me to describe my feelings more 1      2      3      4      5 
13. I don’t know what’s going on inside me 1      2      3      4      5 
14. I often don’t know why I’m angry 1      2      3      4      5 
15. I prefer talking to people about their daily activities rather than 
their feelings 
1      2      3      4      5 
16. I prefer to watch ‘light’ entertainment shows rather than 
psychological dramas 
1      2      3      4      5 
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17. It is difficult for me to reveal my innermost feelings, even to close 
friends 
1      2      3      4      5 
18. I can feel close to someone, even in moments of silence 1      2      3      4      5 
19. I find examination of my feelings useful in solving personal 
problems 
1      2      3      4      5 
20. Looking for hidden meanings in movies or plays distracts from 
their enjoyment 
1      2      3      4      5 
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Appendix B: Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
 
The following statements inquire about your thoughts and feelings in a variety of 
situations.  For each item, indicate how well it describes you by choosing the 
appropriate letter on the scale at the top of the page:  A, B, C, D, or E.  When you 
have decided on your answer, fill in the letter on the answer sheet next to the item 
number.  READ EACH ITEM CAREFULLY BEFORE RESPONDING.  Answer as 
honestly as you can.  Thank you. 
 
ANSWER SCALE: 
 
 A               B               C               D               E 
 DOES NOT                                                     DESCRIBES ME 
DESCRIBE ME                                               VERY WELL                                                             
WELL 
 
1.  I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen to 
me.  
 
2.  I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.  
 
3.  I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view.  
 
4.  Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having 
problems.  
 
5.  I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel.  
 
6.  In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease.  
 
7.! I am usually objective when I watch a movie or play, and I don't often get 
completely caught up in it.  
 
8.  I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision.  
 
9.  When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards 
them.  
 
10.  I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation.  
 
11.! I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look 
from their 
      perspective.  
 
12.  Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is somewhat rare for me.  
 
13.  When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm. 
 
14.  Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. 
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15.! If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other 
people's 
      arguments.  
 
16.  After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters.  
 
17.  Being in a tense emotional situation scares me.  
 
18.! When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much 
pity for them.  
 
19.  I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies.  
 
20.  I am often quite touched by things that I see happen.  
 
21.  I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.  
 
22.  I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.  
 
23.  When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the place of a 
leading 
       character.  
 
24.  I tend to lose control during emergencies.  
 
25.  When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a 
while.  
 
26.! When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if 
the events in the story were happening to me.  
 
27.  When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces. 
 
28.  Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their 
place. 
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Appendix C: Emotion Recognition Task 
 
3 Sample Items displaying the emotions of happiness, happiness, and disgust.  
 
 
 
Participants select one of the following labels for each dynamically displayed image: 
 
ANGRY 
DISGUSTED 
HAPPY 
SAD 
SURPRISED 
FEARFUL 
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Appendix D: Depression, Anxiety, Stress Scales – 21 
 
 
  
Please read each statement and circle a number 0, 1, 2 or 3 which indicates how 
much the statement applied to you over the past week.  There are no right or wrong 
answers.  Do not spend too much time on any statement. The rating scale is as 
follows: 
0 Did not apply to me at all 
1 Applied to me to some degree, or some of the time 
2 Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part of time 
3 Applied to me very much, or most of the time 
1 I found it hard to wind down 0      1      2      3 
2 I was aware of dryness of my mouth 0      1      2      3 
3 I couldn't seem to experience any positive feeling at 
all 
0      1      2      3 
4 I experienced breathing difficulty (e.g., excessively 
rapid breathing, 
breathlessness in the absence of physical exertion) 
0      1      2      3 
5 I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do 
things 
0      1      2      3 
6 I tended to over-react to situations 0      1      2      3 
7 I experienced trembling (e.g., in the hands) 0      1      2      3 
8 I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy 0      1      2      3 
9 I was worried about situations in which I might panic 
and make 
a fool of myself 
0      1      2      3 
10 I felt that I had nothing to look forward to 0      1      2      3 
11 I found myself getting agitated 0      1      2      3 
12 I found it difficult to relax 0      1      2      3 
13 I felt down-hearted and blue 0      1      2      3 
14 I was intolerant of anything that kept me from getting 
on with 
what I was doing 
0      1      2      3 
15 I felt I was close to panic 0      1      2      3 
16 I was unable to become enthusiastic about anything 0      1      2      3 
17 I felt I wasn't worth much as a person 0      1      2      3 
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18 I felt that I was rather touchy 0      1      2      3 
19 I was aware of the action of my heart in the absence 
of physical 
exertion (e.g., sense of heart rate increase, heart 
missing a beat) 
0      1      2      3 
20 I felt scared without any good reason 0      1      2      3 
21 I felt that life was meaningless 0      1      2      3 
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Appendix E: Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
 
Below is a list of statements dealing with your general feelings about yourself.  
Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement.  
1.!On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.   
Strongly Agree    Agree       Disagree    
2.!At times I think I am no good at all.   
Strongly Disagree  
Strongly Agree    Agree       Disagree    
3.!I feel that I have a number of good qualities.   
Strongly Disagree  
Strongly Agree    Agree       Disagree    
4.!I am able to do things as well as most other people.   
Strongly Disagree  
Strongly Agree    Agree       Disagree    
5.!I feel I do not have much to be proud of.   
Strongly Disagree  
Strongly Agree    Agree       Disagree    Strongly Disagree  
6.! I certainly feel useless at times.   
! Strongly Agree    Agree       Disagree            Strongly Disagree  
7.! I feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others.   
Strongly Agree    Agree       Disagree    
8.!I wish I could have more respect for myself.   
Strongly Disagree  
Strongly Agree    Agree       Disagree    
9.!All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.   
Strongly Disagree  
Strongly Agree    Agree       Disagree    
10.!I take a positive attitude toward myself.   
Strongly Disagree  
Strongly Agree    Agree       Disagree    Strongly Disagree  
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Appendix F: Ethics approval letter 
Sent: Wed 21/03/2018 1:01 PM 
To: Cynthia Honan 
Cc: Bonnie Dell; Liam Spicer; Nikki Turner 
Subject: Ethics Amendment Approved: H0016480: An investigation of emotion 
recognition ability and metacognitive judgements of emotion recognition 
performance in trait narcissism 
 
Dear Dr Honan, 
 
Ethics Ref: H0016480 
Title: An investigation of emotion recognition ability and metacognitive judgements 
of emotion recognition performance in trait narcissism 
 
This email is to confirm that the following amendment was approved by the Chair of 
the Tasmania Social Sciences Human Research Ethics Committee on 21/3/2018: 
 
1. Personnel changes - remove Nikki Turner and add Liam Spicer and Bonnie Dell 
2. Research Question - inclusion of an additional research question 
3. Change in Methodology - relating to participant recruitment  
 
All committees operating under the Human Research Ethics Committee (Tasmania) 
Network are registered and required to comply with the National Statement on 
Ethical Conduct in Human Research (NHMRC 2007, updated May 2015). 
 
This email constitutes official approval. If your circumstances require a formal letter 
of amendment approval, please let us know. 
 
Should you have any queries please do not hesitate to contact me. 
 
Kind regards 
 
Natasha Jones 
Admin Officer 
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Appendix G: Participant Recruitment Flyer 
 
Research Volunteers Wanted: Personality, 
Emotion Perception and Perceptions of Ability   
Are you aged between 18-65 years? 
 
We are looking for volunteers to participate in a study investigating certain  
personality traits on emotion perception ability and perceptions of ability. 
As a participant, you will be asked to complete some brief baseline questionnaires,  
and undertake a computer-based emotion recognition task. The questionnaires and  
testing should take no longer than 45 minutes to complete. 
To volunteer or for more information, please email: liam.spicer@utas.edu.au 
Go into the draw to win one of three double movie vouchers 
(KHA111/112 Students may receive 45 mins course credit) 
This study has been approved by the Tasmanian Health and Medical Human 
Research Ethics Committee (#H0016480) 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
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Appendix H: Information Sheet 
Personality, Emotion Perception and Perceptions of Ability.  
Information Sheet for Participants 
Invitation 
You are invited to participate in a research project examining the relationship 
between specific personality traits and emotion perception ability. This research is 
being conducted in partial fulfilment of an Honours degree in psychology for Liam 
Spicer and Bonnie Dell under the supervision of Dr. Cynthia Honan, a Lecturer and 
Clinical Neuropsychologist in the Discipline of Psychology, School of Medicine, 
University of Tasmania. 
What is the purpose of this study? 
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between personality and how 
emotions in other people are perceived. It is possible that the way we appraise the 
emotions of others is dependent on a person’s specific personality traits.  
Why have I been invited to participate? 
You have been invited to participate because you meet the following criteria: 
!! Are aged between 18 and 65 years of age. 
!! Have normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
!! Are fluent in English.  
!! Are not pregnant. 
!! You have no history of traumatic brain injury or other neurological condition. 
!! You are able to spend approximately 20 minutes to complete questionnaires 
and a further 20 minutes to complete an emotion perception task. 
What will I be asked to do? 
You will be asked to complete some standard questionnaires which will ask you for 
basic demographic information, and information relating to current mood, 
personality traits and social functioning. You will also be asked to complete an 
emotion recognition task on the computer. You may complete the questionnaires up 
to 7 days prior to completing the emotion perception task. A mutually suitable 
appointment time will be arranged with you to complete the emotion perception task. 
It is expected that the questions and task together will take approximately 45 minutes 
to complete. 
Are there any possible benefits from participation in this study? 
Your participation will help us to understand the way in which personality traits may 
be related to the perception of emotions in others. This will allow us to identify 
whether specific personality groups exhibit specific social difficulties and will 
inform future research into the possible mechanisms that may underlie social 
difficulties. 
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University of Tasmania students who are undertaking the KHA111/KHA112 course 
will receive 45 minutes of course credit for their time. Participants who are not 
undertaking the KHA111/KHA112 course will go into the draw to win one of three 
double movie passes. 
Are there any possible risks from participation in this study? 
We do not expect there will be any risks associated with participation in this study. 
The data collected will be in no way identifiable to you. 
What if I change my mind during or after the study? 
Participation in this research project is voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any 
time. Participants who withdraw during the research process are free to do so with no 
explanation. Your withdrawal will not in any way affect your relationship with the 
researchers involved in this study or the School of Medicine. Should you withdraw 
from participating at any time, your data will be destroyed and will not included in 
the final study results.  
What will happen to the information when this study is over? 
The data from this study will be stored securely within the Discipline of Psychology, 
School of Medicine. Your data will also be stored anonymously using a unique ID 
code. Identifiable information such as your name and contact details will only be 
used for the purpose of arranging a testing session. Once your testing session has 
been arranged any identifying information will be destroyed. You will be provided 
with a unique ID code, which you will use to complete the questionnaires and testing 
session.  
Data you provide in this research will be stored for a period of five years following 
the completion of the study. After this period, all data will be destroyed. 
How will the results of the study be published? 
The results will be published in Honours theses by Liam Spicer and Bonnie Dell. 
This will be available at the University of Tasmania library after the 3rd November 
2018. A summary of the research results will also be available on the discipline of 
Psychology, University of Tasmania webpage 
(http://www.utas.edu.au/courses/study/psychology). 
No participants will be identifiable in the publication of the results. Research results 
may be published in a peer-reviewed academic journal. Research results can also be 
obtained by contacting the researchers directly. 
What if I have questions about this study? 
If you have any questions regarding this research, please contact Liam Spicer or 
Bonnie Dell (liam.spicer@utas.edu.au). Alternatively, you can contact Dr Cynthia 
Honan on 03 6324 3266 or email cynthia.honan@utas.edu.au. 
This study has been approved by the Tasmanian Social Sciences Human Research 
Ethics Committee. If you have concerns or complaints about the conduct of this 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ALEXITHYMIA AND EMPATHY  
 
 
83 
  
study, please contact the Executive Officer of the HREC (Tasmania) Network on 
+61 3 6226 6254 or email human.ethics@utas.edu.au. The Executive Officer is the 
person nominated to receive complaints from research participants. Please quote 
ethics reference number [H0016480].” 
This information sheet is for you to keep. If you would like to participate in the 
research, please ask the researcher for a participant consent form to complete. 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet. 
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Appendix I: Participant Consent Form 
 
Personality, Emotion Perception and Perceptions of Ability  
 
Consent form for participants 
1.! I agree to take part in the research study named above. 
2.! I have read and understood the Information Sheet for this study. 
3.! The nature and possible effects of the study have been explained to me. 
4.! I understand that the study involves completing questionnaires to determine 
demographic information, current mood, empathy levels, personality traits, 
and social cognitive functioning. Participants will then be asked to complete 
an emotion recognition task on the computer. 
5.! I understand that participation involves no foreseeable risks to participants. 
6.! I understand that all research data will be securely stored on the Psychology 
Department, School of Medicine premises for five years from the publication 
of the study results, and will then be destroyed. 
7.! Any questions that I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. 
8.! I understand that the researcher(s) will maintain confidentiality and that any 
information I supply to the researcher(s) will be used only for the purposes of 
the research.  
9.! I understand that the results of the study will be published so that I cannot be 
identified as a participant.  
10.!I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw at 
any time without any effect.  
If I so wish, I may request that any data I have supplied be withdrawn from 
the research during testing. I understand that I will not be able to withdraw 
my data after completing the testing session, as data will be anonymous. 
 
 
Participant’s name:  
_______________________________________________________  
 
 
Participant’s signature: 
____________________________________________________ 
 
 
Date:  ________________________ 
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Statement by Investigator 
 
 I have explained the project and the implications of participation in this 
study to this volunteer, and I believe that the consent is informed and 
that he/she understands the implications of participation. 
 
If the Investigator has not had an opportunity to talk to participants prior to them 
participating, the following must be ticked. 
 
 The participant has received the information sheet where my details 
have been provided so participants have had the opportunity to contact 
me prior to consenting to participate in this project. 
 
 
Investigator’s name:  
_______________________________________________________  
 
 
Investigator’s signature: 
____________________________________________________ 
 
 
Date:  ________________________ 
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Appendix J – Correlations of all variables 
Note. AffTAS = Affective Alexithymia Traits, CogTAS = Cognitive Alexithymic Traits, AffIRI = Affective Empathy, CogIRI = Cognitive 
Empathy, A_ERT = Anger Emotion Recognition, S_ERT = Sadness Emotion Recognition, F_ERT = Fear Emotion Recognition, AAndi = Anger 
ANDI Statistic, Sandi = Sad ANDI Statistic, FAndi = Fear ANDI Statistic. *denotes p <.05, **denotes p <.01, ***denotes p <.001. 
 AffTAS CogTAS AffIRI CogIRI A_ERT S_ERT F_ER
T 
AAndI SAndi FAndi Age Sex Depressio
n 
Anxiety Stres
s 
Self - 
Esteem 
AffTAS   -                
CogTAS .365***   -               
AffIRI .196* -.190* -!               
CogIRI -.080 -.456*** .562*** -!              
A_ERT -.090 -.023 .015 .044 -!             
S_ERT -.020 -.199* .250** .237** .275** -!            
F_ERT -.009 -.226* .120 .122 .233* .408*** -!           
AAndi .052 -.213* .130 .210* .153 .074 .208* -!          
SAndi -.109 -.231* .067 .178 .232* .352*** .165 -.051 -!         
FAndi .110 .098 .062 .123 .000 -.063 -.092 .080 .214* -!        
Age  -.248** -.248** .095 .048 -.010 .046 .029 .104 .100 -.016 -!       
Sex .009 -.176 .522*** .327*** .163 .209* .137 .171 .052 -.100 .007 -!      
Depression .469*** 0.027 .284* .180* -.103 .027 .124 .102 -.007 .058 -.005 .103 -!     
Anxiety .412*** .004 .316*** .203* -.136 .082 .067 .112 -.038 .166 -.069 .073 .687*** -!    
Stress .385*** .089 .306** .165 -.079 .130 .044 -.007 -.035 .092 -.001 .154 .600*** .640*** -!   
Self Esteem  .134 .061 .037 -.147 .023 .045   .023 -.076 .008 -.033 -.051 .165 .047 -.010 -.138 -!  
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Appendix K – Reliability of all Self-Report Measures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable     Cronbach’s ! 
 
Affective Alexithymic Traits 
            
             .87 
 
Cognitive Alexithymic Traits 
 
.61 
 
Affective Empathy 
 
.78 
 
Cognitive Empathy 
 
.79 
 
Depression 
 
.87 
 
Anxiety 
 
.83 
 
Stress 
 
.85 
 
Self Esteem 
  
.88 
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Appendix L: Write-up of Affective Moderated-Mediation Models 
 
 Anger. Both emotion recognition ability (b1 pathway; B = .08, SE = .27, 
95%CI [-.45, .63], p = .763) and metacognitive ability (b2 pathway; B = 12.31, SE = 
14.21, 95%CI [-15.85, 40.47], p = .388) did not significantly predict cognitive 
empathy. No significant interaction effect of emotion recognition ability and 
metacognitive ability, on cognitive empathy was found (b3 pathway; B = -.70 SE = 
.83, 95%CI [-2.35, 0.94], p = .401. Both sex (B = 7.33, SE = 1.11, 95%CI [5.12, 
9.55], p < .001) and anxiety (B = .25 SE = .09, 95%CI [0.07, 0.43], p = .006) 
significantly predicted cognitive empathy. The direct effect of cognitive alexithymic 
traits on cognitive empathy was non-significant (c’ pathway; B = .09, SE = .07, 
95%CI [-0.05, 0.24], p = .203). The hypothesised conditional indirect effect of 
cognitive alexithymic traits on cognitive empathy through emotion recognition 
ability, as a function of growth orientation was non-significant, a1b3 pathway; B = 
.02, SE = .044, 95%BCI [-.20, .19]. Conditional indirect effects showed that at high, 
mean and low levels of metacognitive ability, emotion recognition ability was not 
significantly related to cognitive empathy, as the bootstrapped 95% confidence 
intervals all contained zero. 
 Fear. Both emotion recognition ability (b1 pathway; B = .10, SE = .19, 
95%CI [-.27, .49], p = .583) and metacognitive ability (b2 pathway; B = 2.98, SE = 
4.32, 95%CI [-5.58, 11.55], p = .492) did not significantly predict cognitive 
empathy. No significant interaction effect of emotion recognition ability and 
metacognitive ability, on cognitive empathy was found (b3 pathway; B = -.12, SE = 
.71, 95%CI [-1.54, 1.28, p = .857. Both sex (B = 7.32, SE = 1.10, 95%CI [5.13, 
9.51], p < .001) and anxiety (B = .24, SE = .09, 95%CI [0.06, 0.42], p = .008) 
significantly predicted cognitive empathy. The direct effect of cognitive alexithymic 
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traits on cognitive empathy was non-significant (c’ pathway; B = .07, SE = .07, 
95%CI [-0.06, 0.22], p = .271). The hypothesised conditional indirect effect of 
cognitive alexithymic traits on cognitive empathy through emotion recognition 
ability, as a function of growth orientation was non-significant, a1b3 pathway; B = 
.001, SE = .049, 95%BCI [-.09, .10]. Conditional indirect effects showed that at 
high, mean and low levels of metacognitive ability, emotion recognition ability was 
not significantly related to cognitive empathy, as the bootstrapped 95% confidence 
intervals all contained zero.   
 Sadness. Emotion recognition ability was a significant positive predictor of 
cognitive empathy (b1 pathway; B = .43, SE = .21, 95%CI [-.01, .86], p = .042). 
Metacognitive ability did not significantly predict cognitive empathy (b2 pathway; B 
= 7.75, SE = 6.10, 95%CI [-4.33, 19.84], p = .206). No significant interaction effect 
of emotion recognition ability and metacognitive ability, on cognitive empathy was 
found (b3 pathway; B = -.81, SE = .62, 95%CI [-2.05, 0.41], p = .192. Both sex (B = 
6.72, SE = 1.10, 95%BCI [4.53, 8.90], p < .001) and anxiety (B = .24, SE = .08, 
95%CI [0.06, 0.41], p = .008) significantly predicted cognitive empathy. The direct 
effect of cognitive alexithymic traits on cognitive empathy was non-significant (c’ 
pathway; B = .09, SE = .07, 95%CI [-0.04, 0.23], p = .171). The hypothesised 
conditional indirect effect of cognitive alexithymic traits on cognitive empathy 
through emotion recognition ability, as a function of growth orientation was non-
significant, a1b3 pathway; B = .007, SE = .048, 95%BCI [-.05, .17]. Conditional 
indirect effects showed that at high, mean and low levels of metacognitive ability, 
emotion recognition ability was not significantly related to cognitive empathy, as the 
bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals all contained zero.   
 
